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ABSTRACT 
Many countries spend sizeable sums of public money on R&D grants to alleviate debt and 
equity gaps for small firms’ innovation projects. In making such awards, knowledgeable 
government officials may certify firms to private financiers. This paper investigates 
whether government subsidies to R&D enhance SMEs’ access to external financing due to 
this certification effect. Using a unique Belgian dataset of 1107 approved requests and a 
control group of 501 denied requests for a specific type of R&D grant, we examine the 
impact on small firms’ external equity, short term and long term debt financing. We find 
that obtaining a R&D subsidy provides a positive signal about SME quality and results in 
better access to long-term debt.  
 
JEL classification codes: G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; 
Capital and Ownership Structure; H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies; O38 - 
Technological Change; Research and Development: Government Policy 
 
Keywords: R&D subsidies, government policy, SMEs, financial constraints, certification 
hypothesis, behavioural additionality  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Does government policy affect the rate and direction of technological evolution by 
SMEs? Most governments appear to think so and deploy a wide variety of instruments to 
foster innovation, including subsidies to R&D. These R&D grants alleviate small firms’ 
tendency to underinvest in innovative activities. However, on top of a direct effect they 
may also generate a certification effect, thereby enhancing a firm’s access to external 
finance and relaxing any potential financial constraints. For instance, Lerner (1999) found 
evidence that obtaining R&D grants positively impacts a firm’s chances of attracting 
venture capital. In this paper, we examine whether government subsidies to R&D 
improves SMEs’ access to external finance in general. 
It is commonly held that small enterprises may face extensive financing 
constraints. Both banks and venture capitalists - the traditional private financiers for small 
firms - are repeatedly unwilling to provide financing, while access to public capital 
markets is regularly unavailable. Informational asymmetries and high levels of uncertainty 
are frequently advanced to explain small firm disadvantages in attracting financing 
(Berger and Udell, 1998).  
Any concerns over asymmetric information and elevated risks are likely to be 
aggravated when funding applications are based upon an intended R&D investment. 
Volatile and intangible returns, information problems and funding providers’ inability to 
adequately assess innovative projects cause SMEs to have poor access to capital for 
innovation (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a; Freel, 2007). Moreover, the innovation assets 
purchased often cannot serve as collateral, thereby further exacerbating banks’ perceptions 
of risk. As a result, one would anticipate that SMEs would be more likely to be credit-
constrained for their R&D projects (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Empirical research 
indeed reports that a great fraction of small firms refers to access to finance as a 
significant obstacle to innovation (Hoffman et al., 1998). Credit rationing is found to 
occur with respect to technology intensive firms specifically (Arrow, 1962; Westhead and 
Storey, 1997) and small innovative firms  more generally (Freel, 1999).  
A strict dependence on a market system will therefore lead to an underinvestment 
in innovation, relative to what is socially desirable, and would potentially hinder SMEs in 
exploiting their full growth potential.  
 5 
Financial constraints have real impact: for example, capital market imperfections 
negatively affect the number of entrepreneurial start-ups and their economic viability 
(Bates, 1990; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). In the face of finance constraints for innovative 
projects, firms may reject or scale down the innovation project (Feldman and Kelley, 
2006), thereby hampering growth in employment, sales, exports and economic welfare. 
Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) provide evidence that capital market imperfections hold 
back SMEs’ innovation and growth. 
In order to resolve this market failure, many countries spend considerable sums of 
public money to alleviate debt and equity gaps for small firms’ innovation projects. A 
wide range of policy schemes, such as tax shields, direct loans, interest subsidies, loan 
guarantees and R&D grants has been implemented (Cressy, 1996; European Commission, 
2003). In theory, one would expect government grants to bring along positive effects, or 
‘additionality’. This may include input (e.g., increase in R&D efforts) or output 
additionality (e.g., increase in growth/employment/number of patents). A third category 
involves behavioural additionality.  
Obtaining a grant may induce changes in an SME’s behaviour, or may change the 
behaviour of other firms or institutions towards the SME. For example, by granting 
subsidies, knowledgeable government officials may certify firms and confer a halo effect 
to private investors or banks. Consequently, R&D grants address the information 
asymmetries that might have otherwise precluded providing financing. This information 
signal may be particularly strong for small firms that would otherwise have difficulty 
attracting the attention of potential investors (Feldman and Kelley, 2006). Studying 1 435 
SBIR awardees and a matched sample, Lerner (1999) finds that R&D grants provide a 
positive signal about SME quality that facilitates attracting venture capital. Feldman and 
Kelley (2006) completed 240 interviews with firms that applied to the 1998 US Advanced 
Technology Program at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. They analyze 
whether receiving a grant increased the company’s funding from other sources: private 
venture capital, state economic development, public venture capital programs, and other 
funding sources which included strategic alliances with other companies as well as other 
federal government R&D programs. A positive relationship is found.  
In this paper, we examine whether obtaining an R&D grant facilitates SMEs’ 
subsequent access to external financing as a consequence of this certification effect. For a 
unique Belgian sample of 1 107 approved requests for a specific type of R&D grant, we 
investigate if any positive effects on future debt or equity financing can be detected. As 
 6 
Lach (2002) points out, in evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy we need to know what 
the subsidized firm would have attracted in external financing had it not received the 
subsidy. This counterfactual information, however, is not available. We estimate the 
missing expected counterfactual by using a control group of 501 applications for the same 
subsidy that were denied. As such, in contrast to much of the research on the effect of 
R&D subsidies, our study reduces selection and endogeneity bias that arises since 
applying for an R&D grant is not a random process (Blanes and Busom, 2004; David et 
al., 2000; Feldman and Kelley, 2006; Klette et al., 2000). 
We find strong evidence that receiving subsidies increases the likelihood that firms 
will raise long term debt. For short term debt, we find a smaller effect. For external equity 
finance, the positive effect is only found for a subsample of start-up SMEs. The 
certification effect of R&D grants is stronger when informational asymmetries are higher. 
Our results are robust to a series of alternative explanations implying that government 
subsidies, on top of a direct effect, generate a significant certifying effect to private 
financiers. It may be worthwhile for governments to consider this behavioural 
additionality when establishing their R&D grant policies.  
Even though academics and policy makers have made considerable effort to 
understand and evaluate the funding environment confronting small would-be innovators, 
the effect of R&D grants on small firms’ ability to raise external financing has attracted 
virtually no scrutiny. To the best of our knowledge, only Lerner (1999) and Feldman and 
Kelley (2006) investigate this issue. Our work adds to the literature since we examine the 
impact of receiving an R&D grant on both equity and debt financing, using a large sample 
and a unique control group of denied requests. In addition, no prior research has looked 
into the effect of obtaining government R&D subsidies on the firm’s access to debt 
financing. Yet, debt markets have traditionally supplied a much larger proportion of 
external finance than equity markets (Esty and Megginson, 2003). Banks are the dominant 
external funding providers in most economies across the world (Qian and Strahan, 2007).  
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Belgium, like many other Continental European countries, has a bank-centered 
capital market, making it a well suited country of analysis.   
It should be noted that the evaluation of public R&D funding is a recent important 
question in the literature, both on political and economic grounds. First, subsidies are a 
major instrument of government expenditure policy (Blanes and Busom, 2004). Second, 
subsidies affect the allocation of resources, income distribution and expenditure 
productivity, and may have an impact on sectoral and structural adjustment (IMF, 1995).   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of the 
method and sample used. The results of our study are presented in Section 4. The paper 
ends with a discussion of the findings and potential avenues for future research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The standard economic rationale for the underinvestment in R&D activity is due to 
two types of market failure: spillovers or imperfect appropriability conditions of 
innovations, and financing gaps induced by asymmetric information (see David et al., 
2000, and Hall, 2002, for an excellent survey on both topics).  
As argued in the seminal papers of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), the public-
good nature and incomplete appropriability of inventive activity means that private returns 
will be lower than social returns. These spillovers may take several forms: innovations 
may for instance benefit rivals who quickly launch imitations, or consumers of the new 
products. Empirical support on spillovers is widespread (Grilliches, 1992, 1998; Hall, 
1996; Jaffe, 1996). Consequently, due to the difficulties that firms encounter in 
appropriating all the benefits associated with an innovation, R&D investment is likely to 
be below the social optimal level (Hall, 2002; Lerner, 1999). Public policy theory calls for 
government intervention to compensate for the gap between the private and social returns 
to innovative activities so as to guarantee the socially optimal supply of R&D efforts by 
the private sector (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004; Wallsten, 2000). 
Further, it is frequently shown that R&D investments are financially constrained 
due to informational asymmetries.  
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In business surveys companies repeatedly allude to the lack of external finance as 
a major obstacle to their investment and innovation activities (Harhoff and Körting, 1998). 
Financing constraints occur for various types of firms or projects in general, and for 
innovative projects in specific (Arrow, 1962; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b; Himmelberg 
and Petersen, 1994; Kamien and Schwartz, 1978; Spence, 1979). For R&D, the innovator 
commonly has superior information about the nature and economic potential of the project 
than prospective financiers. As a result, the lemon’s premium for R&D will be particularly 
high because investors have more difficulty distinguishing good projects from bad 
(Akerlof, 1970; Leland and Pyle, 1977). In summary, informational asymmetries may 
make raising debt or equity for R&D very expensive or even preclude it completely 
(Greenwald et al., 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, a second rationale for public 
subsidies lies in the fact that they may convey information to other potential financiers. 
These problems are particularly important for small businesses. A number of 
studies (Jewkes et al., 1958; Mansfield et al., 1977) suggest that spillover problems are 
worse among smaller firms, which are regularly incapable of defending successfully their 
intangible assets or extracting most of the rents in the product market. Next, several 
empirical papers report evidence that financing constraints have a greater impact on small 
firms’ investment (Berger and Udell, 1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b; Hall, 1992). 
This is partly due to the fact that agency and asymmetric information problems are 
generally more pronounced for small firms (Ennew and Binks, 1995). The focus of this 
work is on financial-market reasons for underinvestment in R&D that persist even in the 
absence of externality-induced underinvestment.  
Government intervention could alleviate underinvestment by small firms in 
innovative activities. Investment in R&D below the optimal level is extremely costly, 
firstly in itself, and secondly because innovations generate substantial external effects on 
technological change, economic welfare and employment (Storey and Tether, 1998a). 
Technological development is acknowledged to be one of the main determinants of 
economic growth. Nowadays, almost all OECD countries offer some sort of grants or 
subsidy schemes to stimulate private R&D activity (Storey and Tether, 1998b). 
Nevertheless, even though market failure is widely accepted as a feature of R&D, it is a 
priori not clear whether public support will meet its objective.  
Ideally, government subsidization of R&D should invoke additionality effects 
(Görg and Strobl, 2005). A large academic literature has evaluated the success of many 
government R&D policies.  
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Klette et al. (2000) and David et al. (2000) surveyed the literature dealing with 
public R&D subsidies and input additionality. Macro-economic studies usually identify a 
complementary relationship between public and private R&D expenditure, whereas 
studies on the firm level are not able to confirm this effect (Czarnitski and Fier, 2001). 
Another part of the literature has assessed the effectiveness of various financial assistance 
schemes by taking different output measures into account, including the impact on 
technology use (Wallsten, 2000), productivity and efficiency (Bergström, 2000; Harrison 
and Robinson, 2001), survival probabilities (Jarmin, 1999) and employment performance 
(Girma et al., 2003). As noted by Girma et al. (2003), the evidence is mixed. Subsidies are 
often ineffective and costly due to crowding out effects and since government 
involvement may be distorted by the desire of interest groups or politicians to maximize 
their own utility (IMF, 1995).  
However, government support may also result in behavioural additionality 
(Buisseret et al., 1995); it may change an SME’s behaviour, or it may affect the behaviour 
of others towards the SME. Actions related to governmental agencies, like approving new 
products, granting patents or awarding subsidies, may serve as an information signal to 
other investors (Narayanan et al., 2000). Lerner (1999) finds for a sample of US firms that 
obtaining SBIR grants provides a positive signal about the SME’s quality which facilitates 
raising venture capital. In granting an award, knowledgeable government officials may 
certify firms to private investors and deal with the information problems that might have 
otherwise prohibited attracting financing. Specifically, a government agency with a 
reputation for elevated standards and scientific integrity that judges a risky R&D project 
to be worthy of a pecuniary investment certifies that the technology has merit. 
Furthermore, when the agency’s assessment is linked to the commercialization potential, 
private investors may consider the award winning project as more valuable than other high 
risk research projects (Feldman and Kelley, 2006). Thus, government funding may confer 
a halo effect, enhancing the firm’s chances of attracting external debt and equity 
financing.  
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Feldman and Kelley (2006) indeed find that receipt of R&D grants increases the 
funding from other sources. The main research question we address in this study, 
therefore, is whether government subsidies increase a firm’s access to external equity and 
debt financing through a process of certification.  
Numerous papers have illustrated the existence and importance of certification 
effects in various areas of corporate finance. In the context of IPOs, hiring a reputable 
accounting firm (Beatty, 1989; Titman and Trueman, 1986), a prestigious underwriter 
(Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990) and having VC backing (Barry et al., 
1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) or a reputable alliance partner (Stuart et al., 1999) all 
serve as strong signals that the firm going public is of high quality. James (1987) and 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) provide evidence of certification generated by bank loan 
announcements and renewals; other examples include credit ratings (Boot et al., 2006; 
Sufi, 2007), relationship banks (Bharath et al., 2007) and the percentage lead arrangers 
hold in loan syndication (Dahiya et al., 2003; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Gatti et al., 
2007). 
 
The arguments presented above lead to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Receiving government R&D subsidies increases SMEs’ access to 
external financing through a process of certification.  
 
Furthermore, the impact of receiving a subsidy may differ between debt and 
equity. Pecking order theories (Myers and Majluf, 1984) clearly illustrate that the role of 
information asymmetry is most significant for equity, which will result in a considerable 
lemon's premium when issuing equity to new, outside shareholders. Therefore, one might 
expect that the impact of certification is strongest for attracting equity. Lerner (1999) and 
Feldman and Kelley (2006) indeed find that R&D grants provide a positive signal about 
SME quality that facilitates attracting a particular source of new equity, namely venture 
capital.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: The positive impact of the certification effect generated by 
receiving an R&D subsidy is stronger for equity financing than for debt financing. 
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On the other hand, it is well established that venture capitalists, as specialized 
financial intermediaries, are experts in information collection and processing, and thus 
may mitigate the substantial information problems surrounding SMEs' innovative projects 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999). For banks, reducing information asymmetry is much harder 
and judging SMEs' high tech investments might be challenging as it requires a profound 
understanding of how the firm and its markets operate. As a result, the assessment of 
future cash flows of R&D projects is often unfeasible (Binks and Ennew, 1996). High tech 
SMEs typically complain with banks of their limited competency in correctly evaluating 
their business potential and about the resulting excessive amount of warranties required. 
Smaller firms suffer most from these problems (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Storey and 
Tether, 1998a). These elements would predict a stronger positive signalling effect of the 
grant receipt for debt financing.   
 
Hypothesis 2b: The positive impact of the certification effect generated by 
receiving an R&D subsidy is stronger for debt financing than for equity financing. 
 
Finally, we expect a differential effect depending on the maturity of the debt 
provided. From the perspective of a bank, offering long term debt is more risky. Banks, 
therefore, will only consider granting long-term debt when they have favourable 
information about the lender.  
Diamond (1991, 1993) argues that short-term financing makes it more difficult for 
borrowers to defraud creditors as it limits the period during which firms can exploit their 
creditors without defaulting. A series of short-term loans permits bankers to retain greater 
control because of the option to stop rolling over the short term loans. Creditors can 
review the firm's decisions more regularly and adapt the loan terms before sufficient 
losses have accumulated to make default by the borrower optimal. Thus, short term debt 
acts as a disciplining device.  
The threat of liquidation and the continuous scrutiny of the firm may lead to a 
greater level of efficiency and a reduction in wasteful activities by managers (Jensen, 
1986; Rajan, 1992). Moreover, long term debt results in greater distortions in managers’ 
risk preferences than does short term debt. When investment is financed through debt, this 
creates an incentive problem as the project's profits need to be split between shareholders 
and debtholders. Shareholders may underinvest and pass up valuable projects if they do 
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not capture enough of the return. Short term debt can mitigate this conflict of interest 
(Myers, 1977). 
 
Consequently, we put forward the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of the certification effect generated by receiving 
an R&D subsidy is stronger for long term debt financing than for short term debt 
financing. 
 
3. DATA, METHODS AND RESULTS 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Empirical Setting: IWT-Flanders’ SME Innovation Program  
The empirical evidence of this paper is based on a database containing detailed 
data of subsidies granted by the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science and 
Technology in Flanders1 (IWT-Flanders). IWT-Flanders was established in 1991 by the 
Flemish government as a regional public institution to provide R&D and innovation 
support in Flanders. IWT has several financial tools and an annual budget of €262 million 
(in 2006) available to support projects.  
                                               
 
1
 Flanders is the Dutch speaking part of Belgium and the largest region of the country. 
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In addition to direct funding, a variety of services is provided to the local industry 
in the field of technology transfer, partner search, information about international subsidy 
programs, etc. IWT also has an important co-ordination mission, aiming at a strong co-
operation between all organizations in Flanders offering technological innovation services 
to companies. 
IWT-Flanders has various programs aimed at providing financial support for 
research and development in the private sector. Although SMEs may have opportunities to 
attract R&D grants from other government related institutions as well, IWT-Flanders is by 
far the most important provider of this type of subsidies in Belgium. In this study, we 
examine the impact of IWT-Flanders’ SME innovation program on SMEs’ access to 
external financing sources. This program targets all SMEs established in Flanders who 
want to prepare an innovation initiative that can generate economic added value. In 2004, 
240 projects received funding within this program for a total of €13.43 million. There 
exist two types of subsidies within this SME program: innovation studies and innovation 
projects. The main goal of an innovation study is to increase knowledge in the area of a 
technical/scientific problem or idea. The duration of these studies is between 3 and 12 
months. Companies can apply for funding for 6 different types of innovation studies. The 
main goal of an innovation project is to develop technological knowledge and to 
implement it, for example, by building a prototype. This should result in new or improved 
products, processes and services. The duration of a project is between 6 and 24 months. 
IWT-Flanders uses different criteria to evaluate applications for subsidies. The first 
criterion is the extent of technological innovation and knowledge acquisition and the 
quality of the execution. The second criterion is the commercialization potential and the 
economic value added for Flanders. A third criterion is the financial viability of the firm 
requesting a subsidy. In general, the subsidy will cover a certain percentage of the eligible 
costs. On average, the support rate is 50%. The maximum subsidy is €250 000.   
We obtained a unique dataset from IWT-Flanders on subsidies requested and 
subsidies granted within the SME innovation program over the period 1995-2004. In total, 
1 608 projects were submitted by 1 185 different companies (see Table 1).  
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It is clear from this table that the number of subsidies increased substantially from 
2001 onwards, while the approval rate declined somewhat. Overall, almost 70% of the 
requests were approved. The number of subsidies for innovation studies and innovation 
projects is equally distributed even though there is some variation from year to year. In 
evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy, it is important to know what the subsidized firm 
would have attracted in external financing had it not received the subsidy (Lach, 2002). In 
the analyses, therefore, we also include those firms that submitted a request for a subsidy 
but were subsequently declined.  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
For each firm that requested a subsidy we collected financial statement data for a 
period of maximum 10 years through Belfirst, a commercial database provided by Bureau 
Van Dijk. Belfirst contains financial statement data of all public and private Belgian 
companies. All Belgian companies (with limited liability of the shareholders), irrespective 
of their size, have to file detailed financial statement data with the National Bank of 
Belgium. Both companies starting up within the time frame of this study and firms 
disappearing from the database, because they failed or were taken over, are included. 
Therefore, there is no survivorship bias in our study. By combining the IWT dataset with 
the financial accounts provided by Belfirst, our final sample contains data for 6 822 firm 
years. 
 
3.1.2 Variables 
Dependent variables. In this study, the dependent variables indicate whether a 
firm uses a specific type of financing in a given year. We distinguish between external 
equity financing and short term and long term financial debt. Firms are coded as using 
short term financial debt if there is a net increase of outstanding financial debt with a 
maturity of less than or equal to one year which exceeds 5% of total assets (short term 
debt).  
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This 5% cut-off point is consistent with previous studies and guarantees that the 
focus of the analyses is on relatively substantial financing events (de Haan and Hinloopen, 
2003; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Marsh, 1982; Van Acker et al, 2008).2  Similarly, firms are 
coded as using long term financial debt if there is a net increase of outstanding financial 
debt with a maturity of more than one year which exceeds 5% of total assets (long term 
debt). Firms are coded as raising external equity financing when there is a net increase in 
external equity of at least 5% of total assets (external equity). Equity can be raised either 
from existing or new shareholders. 
Independent variables. Our first independent variable indicates whether a firm 
received a subsidy in a certain year (subsidy_received). As the effect of receiving a 
subsidy on attracting financing may only materialize in the year after the subsidy was 
received, this variable is coded 1 both in the year the subsidy was received and the year 
after the subsidy was received.3 Otherwise this variable is coded 0. Our second 
independent variable indicates whether a firm has applied for a subsidy but was declined 
funding (subsidy_rejected). Again, this variable takes on the value 1 in the year the 
subsidy was requested and subsequently declined and the year after.  
Control variables. We include a wide set of control variables. These variables are 
lagged one year in order to avoid problems of reverse causality. Where appropriate, our 
control variables are scaled by total assets for standardization. Furthermore, variables are 
calculated using book values. First of all, we control for the need of external finance by 
measuring the amount of internal finance available within the firm. Following the pecking 
order theory, managers prefer to fund new investment with internally generated funds 
rather than debt, but prefer debt to external equity financing (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). As proxies for the amount of internal finance we use the amount of liquid 
assets, the dividend ratio and the cash flow ratio (De Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). The 
amount of liquid assets is measured by the total amount of liquid assets as a percentage of 
total assets (liquidity). Dividends are measured by dividing the total amount of dividends 
by total assets (dividend ratio).  
The higher this ratio, the less financing will be available internally. Cash flow 
generation is proxied by dividing EBITDA by total assets (cash flow ratio). The higher 
                                               
 
2
 We tested the effect of using different cut-off points for each type of financing event in order to check the 
robustness of the results. The results were similar when using a cut-off point in the range of 3% to 10%.   
3
 We also tested the effect of receiving a subsidy on attracting financing two years and three years after the 
subsidy was granted. Our results were never significant however. 
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this variable, the more cash will be available internally and the less likely firms will have 
to attract outside funding. We also control for firm solvency by including the firm’s 
financial debt to total assets ratio (leverage). Following the traditional static trade-off 
theory, the higher the leverage, the less likely firms will be able to attract additional debt 
financing as the potential costs of bankruptcy will increase (Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
Furthermore, we control for potential agency problems between inside managers and 
outside investors. Agency costs are particularly prevalent in a setting characterized by 
considerable growth options. Firms generally engage in research and development to 
generate growth options (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Consequently, we use the ratio of 
intangible to total assets (intangible assets) as a proxy for agency costs. Further, we 
include the ratio of tangible to total assets (tangible assets) as firms with more tangible 
assets can more easily provide collateral in order to attract debt financing (Hovakimian et 
al., 2001). In order to control for size, we include the natural logarithm of a firm’s total 
assets (firm size). Larger firms can more easily attract outside funding as there will be less 
informational asymmetry for outside investors. Further, their cash flows are less volatile 
and, therefore, the probability and expected costs of bankruptcy will be lower 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). Lastly, we include year dummies to control for time effects. As 
we employ fixed effects in the analyses, we control for time independent unobserved 
heterogeneity at the firm level. Section 3.2.4 will introduce some additional control 
variables that we use in our robustness checks.  
 
3.1.3 Descriptives 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the number of financing events in each year. 
These figures clearly illustrate that long-term debt is the most popular funding source 
followed by short term debt financing. External equity finance is less popular as a 
financing source. This is in line with previous research that has shown that firms follow a 
pecking order when looking for funding (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
percentage of firms making use of a certain financing source is relatively stable over the 
different years. 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables 
used in the analyses. On average, 7.6% of the firms included in the sample received a 
subsidy in a given year. Further, on average 3.7% of the firms requested a subsidy in a 
given year that was subsequently rejected.  
The mean size of a subsidy is slightly more than €50 000, whereas the median 
subsidy equals €30 000. Average firm total assets are about €3 million. The financial 
ratios indicate that most firms generate internal finance through their ongoing activities. 
For example, the average cash flow ratio amounts to 12%. Mean leverage is quite high 
and equals almost 70%. Intangible assets make up only a small percentage of the total 
amount of assets in the average firm.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Hypothesis Testing Procedure  
Since the dependent variable is a binary outcome and we have longitudinal data,  
we employ a conditional fixed effect logit panel model to analyze the effect of receiving a 
subsidy on attracting financing. A fixed effects model makes it possible to control for all 
the unobservable characteristics of the firm that are stable over time. The general model 
testing our hypothesis takes the following form: 
 
Financing eventt = f(subsidy_receivedt/t-1, subsidy_rejectedt/t-1, control variablest-1)    (1) 
 
In each regression we lose a number of observations since the dependent variable 
does not always vary within a firm. For example, some firms never raised external equity 
and therefore drop out of the equation. The number of observations thus fluctuates among 
the different regressions. Table 4 indicates that most independent and control variables are 
not strongly correlated with each other.  
All correlations between the variables used in the regressions are below 0.60. VIFs 
were found not to exceed 2, well within the acceptable guideline of 10 (Cohen et al., 
2003).  
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Insert Table 4 About Here 
 
3.2.2 The Impact of Subsidies on Funding Decisions 
The main results are reported in Table 5. All the models are statistically 
significant. The dependent variable in each of the models is a binary variable equal to one 
if the firm attracted a specific type of financing in that particular year, and otherwise equal 
to zero. 
Model 1 is a baseline model that includes the effect of our control variables on 
attracting long term debt. Most of the control variables have the expected sign. 
Surprisingly, a higher amount of tangible assets results in a lower probability of using 
long term debt financing. In model 2, the effect of subsidies is introduced. The positive 
coefficient for receiving a subsidy suggests that firms who are granted a subsidy are more 
likely to attract long term debt. The economic effect is considerable: receiving a subsidy 
increases the probability of receiving long term debt by 32%. 
Model 3 analyzes the effect of our control variables on receiving short term 
financial debt. In model 4, we add the effect of receiving subsidies. The coefficient of 
receiving a subsidy is marginally significant. This indicates that obtaining a subsidy may 
enhance a firm's ability to attract short-term debt. Receiving a subsidy increases the 
likelihood of attracting short term debt by 21%.  
Model 5 examines the effect of our control variables on obtaining external equity. 
In model 6, the effect of applying for and receiving a subsidy is included. None of these 
variables is significantly related to the use of external equity as a funding source. At first 
sight, this result seems to contrast with Lerner (1999) who finds a positive impact of 
receiving a grant on a firm’s ability to attract venture capital, and would tend to support 
Hypothesis 2b.  
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However, in our sample external equity is typically attracted from the current 
shareholders, who are insiders not subject to information problems. Therefore, it is 
straightforward that we find a stronger impact of the certification effect generated by 
receiving an R&D subsidy for (outsider) debt financing than for (insider) equity financing. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to fine tune our analysis by explicitly 
distinguishing between equity attracted from existing or new shareholders. Thus, we 
observe the relationship predicted in Hypothesis 2b, but the underlying motivation would 
be different: equity providers are usually insiders whereas banks are outsiders to the firm. 
Given our dataset, we cannot tell whether the certification effect differs between equity or 
debt provided by outsiders.  
It should also be noted that all models in Table 5 indicate that the coefficient of 
applying for but not receiving a R&D subsidy is never significant. This can be explained 
since this negative signal may not be revealed by the firm.  
To summarize Table 5, receiving subsidies increases the likelihood that firms will 
raise long term and short term debt. Both effects are economically significant but the 
impact on long term debt financing is more substantial. There is no effect of getting 
subsidies on raising external equity finance.  
Insert Table 5 About Here 
 
3.2.3 Information Asymmetry and the Impact of Subsidies on Funding Decisions 
Berger and Udell (1998) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002a) argue that 
information problems are frequently more important for small and young companies, and 
for high tech businesses. The signal that receiving a subsidy communicates to external 
financiers is likely to have a greater impact when there is more asymmetric information 
and uncertainty regarding the quality of the underlying firm.  
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Therefore, we include an interaction term between receiving a subsidy and 
whether or not the firm is a start-up company i.e. a firm younger than two years, which is 
the case for 8.3% of the firms in our sample.4 Start-up companies have no track record yet 
and hence there will be more uncertainty regarding their quality. Further, the likelihood of 
attracting outside funding will depend on the strength of the signal. The impact of 
receiving a subsidy for an innovation project is likely to be higher than that of an 
innovation study. After all, an innovation study does not automatically lead to the 
development of a new product or service whereas innovation projects need to result in 
something more material such as a prototype. Moreover, projects run for a longer period 
of time and involve higher amounts. The strength of the signal of receiving a subsidy for 
an innovation project is therefore likely to be higher than that of an innovation study.  
In Table 6 we examine these issues by introducing an interaction effect between 
receiving a subsidy and a dummy indicating whether the firm is a start-up or not, and 
between receiving a subsidy and a dummy reflecting the type of subsidy. In model 1 we 
look at the effect of the interaction variables on receiving long term financial debt. The 
interaction term between the starter dummy and receiving a subsidy is not significant. The 
interaction variable between type of subsidy and receiving a subsidy has the expected sign 
and is significant. This indicates that innovation projects are more likely to lead to long 
term debt increases. In model 2, in which we look at the effect of subsidies on attracting 
short term debt, none of the interaction terms is significant even though they have the 
expected sign. In model 3, the dependent variable indicates whether a firm was able to 
attract external equity finance. The positive coefficient for the interaction term between 
the starter dummy and receiving a subsidy suggests that the effect of receiving a subsidy 
on attracting external equity finance is stronger for start-up firms in line with the 
signalling hypothesis. The effect is marginally significant.  
To summarize Table 6, we find evidence that the impact of receiving a subsidy on 
attracting outside funding is more important for start-up firms which are characterized by 
higher levels of informational asymmetry and for innovation project subsidies which 
provide a stronger signal.  
                                               
 
4
 We also used a cut-off point of three years. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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Our finding that the positive impact of receiving an R&D grant is stronger for 
firms that are more likely to suffer from information problems provides additional support 
for the certification hypothesis.  
Insert Table 6 About Here 
 
3.2.4 Testing the Robustness of the Certification Hypothesis 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we extend our analysis with a number 
of additional control variables.  
One alternative argument why firms are more likely to attract external funding 
when they receive a subsidy is because their balance sheet is strengthened (Lerner, 1999). 
After all, a subsidy increases the solvency position of a firm. Subsidies, therefore, provide 
a buffer function and hence attracting outside funding might be facilitated. Following this 
alternative explanation, the larger the size of the subsidy, the more likely firms will be 
able to attract outside funding. By contrast, the certification hypothesis suggests that there 
may not be a positive relationship between the amount of subsidies and the likelihood of 
raising external funding (Lerner, 1999). In order to test this alternative explanation, we 
include the relative size of the subsidy, calculated by dividing the subsidy amount by total 
assets in the year the grant was received (relative size subsidy), in the regression analyses. 
The mean value of this variable equals 4.44%. Table 7 reports that none of the interaction 
terms is significant, therefore lending support to the certification hypothesis. Note, 
however, that the effect of receiving a subsidy on attracting short term debt is still positive 
but no longer significant. 
 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
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Further, receiving a subsidy automatically creates a funding need as the subsidy 
covers only a certain percentage of the total amount needed and, therefore, additional 
financing is necessary. In order to deal with this potential problem of spurious correlation, 
we interact our dummy for receiving a subsidy with the percentage of the project or study 
not covered by the subsidy (percentage project not funded by subsidy). On average, 
49.37% of the funds asked for will not be provided. Our results are reported in Table 8. As 
expected, the significantly positive coefficients of the interaction terms designate that a 
larger percentage of the project not covered by the subsidy results in a higher probability 
of attracting both short and long term debt as well as equity. Model 1 illustrates that the 
main effect of receiving a subsidy is still positive and significant indicating that 
irrespective of the funding need not covered by the subsidy, firms are more likely to 
attract additional long term debt financing. A similar result can be observed in model 2 in 
which we look at the impact of receiving a subsidy on attracting short term debt. Both the 
main effect and the interaction effect are marginally significant.  
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Finally, the finding that firms which receive a subsidy are more likely to attract 
additional funding might be due to the fact that those firms that receive a subsidy are 
inherently of higher quality and, therefore, irrespective of receiving a subsidy, have better 
chances to receive funding from external sources. One criterion IWT-Flanders uses to 
evaluate the overall quality of a project is the financial health of the firm applying for a 
subsidy (IWT, 2008). One way to assess a firm`s financial viability is to calculate the 
probability of financial distress. Our proxy for the probability of financial distress is the 
OJD-score, which is similar to the Altman Z-statistic, but adapted to the Belgian context 
(financial health) (Altman, 1968; Altman and Narayanan, 1997; Ooghe et al., 1995). A 
higher score indicates a lower risk of failure. Table 9 reports the results. Note that the 
number of observations drops considerably as the financial health variable could only be 
calculated for a subsample of firms for which the financial records were complete.  
Not surprisingly, financially healthier firms are more likely to attract both equity 
and short and long term debt. Our main effect of receiving a subsidy on attracting long 
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term debt remains unchanged. The effect of receiving a subsidy on raising short term debt 
disappears however. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
In summary, Table 7, 8 and 9 indicate that the results presented in Table 5 and 
Section 3.2.2 are robust to a series of alternative explanations. In line with the certification 
hypothesis, Table 6 provides evidence that the effect of R&D grants is stronger when 
informational asymmetries are higher. Therefore, our findings confirm that receiving 
government R&D subsidies increases SMEs’ access to external financing through a 
process of certification (Hypothesis 1). The impact of the signal is stronger for long term 
than for short term debt financing (Hypothesis 3). All our analyses consistently indicate 
that receiving subsidies increases the likelihood of raising long term debt whereas most of 
our models find a significant though smaller effect on attracting short term debt. Finally, 
the effect is stronger for debt financing than for equity financing, as put forward in 
Hypothesis 2b. However, the reasons why we find this differs from our theoretical 
motivation. Therefore, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 2b in the strict sense as our dataset 
does not allow explicitly distinguishing between equity provided by insiders or outsiders.  
   
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examine whether obtaining an R&D grant provides a positive 
certification effect that facilitates SMEs’ subsequent access to debt and equity financing. 
We use a unique Belgian dataset of 1 107 approved requests and a control group of 501 
denied requests for a specific type of R&D grant. Thus, in contrast to much of the research 
on the effect of R&D subsidies, our study reduces selection and endogeneity bias that 
arises since firms self-select into applying for an R&D grant.  
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As Feldman and Kelley (2006) argue, collecting data on all SMEs that applied for 
a subsidy and comparing winners and non-winners is consistent with a quasi-experimental 
program evaluation design. This permits to empirically test whether the government 
program meets its objectives and to identify how the program might be optimized. It 
further enables governments to examine the broader prospects of their program, e.g. 
regarding innovation and economic growth, in an unbiased way.  
Few papers have analyzed the effect of R&D grants on small firms’ ability to 
attract external financing. Our work adds to the literature since we examine the impact of 
receiving an R&D grant on both equity and debt financing, using a large and unique 
sample. Studying the effects of subsidies is important as they are a major instrument of 
government expenditure policy and affect the allocation of resources, income distribution 
and expenditure productivity (IMF, 1995). This paper provides new insights in the effects 
generated by R&D subsidies.  
Our empirical evidence shows that obtaining an R&D grant provides a positive 
certification effect that facilitates SMEs’ subsequent access to financing. Receiving 
subsidies increases the likelihood of raising long term debt. We find a positive but smaller 
effect for short term debt. For external equity finance, a positive effect is found for start-
up SMEs. The certification effect of R&D grants is stronger in case of higher asymmetric 
information. Our results are robust to a number of alternative explanations. We thus 
provide strong support for the signaling hypothesis, which entails that public R&D 
subsidies, on top of a direct effect, generate a significant certifying effect to private 
financiers. As adequate access to external finance for SMEs’ innovative investments is 
crucial for the success of small businesses and economic growth, governments should 
consider this when establishing their R&D grant policies. 
Alternative explanations for firms that obtained a government subsidy to have 
greater success at raising subsequent financing exist. First, firms that receive public grants 
may just have superior R&D projects. Second, the government subsidy may raise the 
project’s return above a reasonable hurdle rate for other financiers (Feldman and Kelley, 
2006).  
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Yet, one would expect that if the main effect of receiving public subsidies is to 
improve a firm’s solvency, there should be a positive relationship between the amount of 
the subsidy received and the likelihood of attracting external financing. By contrast, the 
certification hypothesis suggests that there may not be such a relationship (Lerner, 1999). 
Our study is subject to various limitations. First, due to lack of data, we examine 
the impact of getting an IWT-Flanders grant on a firm’s ability to attract external 
financing without controlling for any other government grants the firm may have received.  
The IWT-Flanders R&D grants, however, are the most important subsidy for SMEs that 
want to pursue innovative activities. We therefore feel that the resulting bias will be small. 
Second, endogeneity problems may potentially bias our results. Does receiving a subsidy 
increase the likelihood of attracting external financing, or does a larger need for financing 
result in firms obtaining subsidies? However, we have attempted to eliminate this problem 
in various ways. We used lagged control variables in our analysis. Next, we included a 
sample of firms that requested the same subsidy but were denied. These firms are 
expected to have a similar requirement for financing. Finally, we incorporated several 
variables in our analysis that explicitly control for the firm’s external financing need. 
Despite the major role of small firms within an economy, the large amounts spent 
on government subsidies and academics’ interest in interactions between governments and 
(small) firms, the public subsidization of small firms has attracted modest analysis 
(Lerner, 1999). Furthermore, there is little quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of 
public subsidy policies (Lach, 2002).  
Obviously, this presents many potential avenues for further research. More work is 
needed on the determinants of applying for and receiving grants. This is important as it is 
otherwise hard to accurately evaluate the impact of public subsidies. Regarding input and 
output additionality of subsidies, the empirical evidence is rather mixed, therefore calling 
for studies that use large and complete datasets, containing information about all 
applicants for a particular type of subsidy. A more extensive investigation of behavioural 
effects generated by obtaining subsidies and their impact on a firm’s ability to attract 
future financing would be interesting as well.  
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For instance, a detailed analysis for the various types of financing would prove 
useful. One could for instance distinguish between equity raised from existing or new 
shareholders; venture capital or business angel financing; various types of bank debt; etc. 
A further investigation of which firm, financier or general market characteristics affect the 
certification effect would also be valuable. We leave this for future research. 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of the Sample by Year and Type of Subsidy 
 
Requested Approved Approval 
rate 
Innovation 
studies 
Innovation 
projects 
Year N %  N %        % N % N % 
1995 68 3.6 48 3.9 70.6 9 18.8 39 81.3 
1996 76 4.0 62 5.0 81.6 28 45.2 34 54.8 
1997 87 4.6 60 4.9 69.0 31 51.7 29 48.3 
1998 70 3.7 54 4.4 77.1 24 44.4 30 55.6 
1999 61 3.2 45 3.7 73.8 23 51.1 22 48.9 
2000 68 3.6 49 4.0 72.1 23 46.9 26 53.1 
2001 192 10.2 111 9.0 57.8 61 55.0 50 45.0 
2002 318 16.8 232 18.8 73.0 120 51.7 112 48.3 
2003 319 16.9 206 16.7 64.6 101 49.0 105 51.0 
2004 349 18.5 240 19.5 68.8 130 54.2 110 45.8 
Total   1 608 100.0 1 107 100.0 69.2 550 49.7 557 50.3 
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TABLE 2 
Financing events 
 
Long term debt Short term debt External equity 
Year N N % N % N % 
1996 450 67 14.89 71 15.78 16 3.56 
1997 541 93 17.19 80 14.79 26 4.81 
1998 594 113 19.02 96 16.16 26 4.38 
1999 630 125 19.84 106 16.83 38 6.03 
2000 666 97 14.56 108 16.22 31 4.65 
2001 730 114 15.62 83 11.37 38 5.21 
2002 813 104 12.79 108 13.28 30 3.69 
2003 839 120 14.30 129 15.38 32 3.81 
2004 855 106 12.40 121 14.15 36 4.21 
Total 6118 939 15.35 902 14.74 273 4.46 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
         N      MEAN      S. D.   Median         Min.             Max. 
       
Subsidy_received 6 822        0.08       0.26       0.00        0.00          1.00 
Subsidy_rejected 6 822       0.04       0.19       0.00        0.00  1.00 
Subsidy amount a 950     51.45     47.79     30.00        2.40 242.16 
Total assets a 6 822 3312.13 4109.45 1722.00        1.00 26945.12 
Liquidity (%) 6 822       8.86     11.87       4.77        0.00 100.00 
Dividend ratio (%) 6 822       1.01       4.65       0.00        0.00 130.00 
Cashflow ratio (%) 6 822     12.78     18.20     12.98  -199.88 95.65 
Leverage (%) 6 822     68.91     27.17     72.26       0.00 299.00 
Intangible assets (%) 6 822       2.13       6.95       0.00       0.00 69.50 
Tangible assets (%) 6 82      24.96     19.54       0.21     20.52 99.53 
Relative size subsidy (%) 950       4.44       9.46       1.59       0.03 144.28 
Percentage project not 
funded by subsidy (%) 950     49.37     13.58     40.00       2.00 75.00 
Financial health  1991        0.68       1.79       0.71    -24.00 5.58 
       
a The amounts are expressed in €1 000. 
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TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlationsa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Subsidy_received 1.00             
2. Subsidy_rejected -0.10* 1.00            
3. Subsidy amount 
-0.01  1.00           
4. Firm size a 0.02 -0.03* 0.16* 1.00          
5. Liquidity (%) 0.00 0.03* 0.01 -0.23* 1.00         
6. Dividend ratio (%) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.08* 0.10* 1.00        
7. Cashflow ratio (%) -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.03* 0.05* 0.17* 1.00       
8. Leverage (%) -0.02* 0.02 0.00 -0.10* -0.17* -0.05* -0.18* 1.00      
9. Intangible assets (%) 0.04* 0.04* 0.06* -0.07* -0.06* -0.04* -0.16* 0.06* 1.00     
10. Tangible assets (%) -0.02 0.00 -0.10* -0.02* -0.19* -0.07* 0.15* 0.17* -0.11* 1.00    
11. Relative size subsidy (%) 0.01 -0.04* 0.27* -0.40* 0.11* -0.03* 0.00 0.03* 0.07* -0.04* 1.00   
12. Percentage project not funded by 
subsidy (%) -0.24* 0.32* 0.48* -0.04* 0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.04* 1.00  
13. Financial health  -0.03 -0.04 -0.11* 0.07* 0.21* 0.12* 0.54* -0.51* -0.23* -0.01 -0.12* 0.03 1.00 
 
             
 a n=6 822 
* p<0.05  
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TABLE 5 
 
Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Model: External Financing Events Following Subsidiesab 
 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 
Dependent Variables Long term debt Long term debt Short term debt Short term debt External equity finance 
External equity 
finance 
           
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1   0.28** 0.11   0.19* 0.11   0.20 0.18 
Subsidy_rejected
 t / t-1   0.21 0.18   0.02 0.19   0.12 0.30 
Liquidityt-1 1.09** 0.51 1.10** 0.52 -1.15* 0.62 -1.13* 0.62 -0.16 0.73 -0.20 0.73 
Dividend ratiot-1 1.69* 0.93 1.74* 0.93 1.54* 0.92 1.52 0.92 -24.74* 13.78 -25.01* 13.85 
Cashflow ratiot-1 -0.61* 0.33 -0.65** 0.33 -0.36 0.33 -0.39 0.33 -0.08 0.32 -0.10 0.32 
Leveraget-1 -1.03*** 0.30 -1.03*** 0.30 -0.47* 0.28 -0.47* 0.28 1.44*** 0.30 1.45*** 0.30 
Intangible assetst-1 -0.76 0.85 -0.85 0.86 -0.44 0.86 -0.52 0.86 1.39* 0.81 1.31 0.82 
Tangible assetst-1 -2.16*** 0.42 -2.18*** 0.42 0.69* 0.42 0.68 0.42 -0.55 0.63 -0.61 0.63 
Firm sizet-1 1.21*** 0.12 1.22*** 0.12 0.53*** 0.11 0.54*** 0.11 0.42*** 0.13 0.42*** 0.13 
             
Number of observations          4 425         4 551           3 914           3 914       1 656     1 656  
Number of groups            714           714              630              630       300       300  
Log likelihood   -1 503.78  -1 500.13  -1 428.68     -1 427.23      -509.28  -508.58  
P-value of log likelihood test       <.0001     <.0001         <.0001         <.0001       <.0001   <.0001  
a
 Dependent variable equals 1 if financing event occurs, 0 otherwise. 
b Year dummies are not reported here. 
   * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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TABLE 6 
Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Model: External Financing Events Following 
Subsidies: Testing Interaction Effects for Type of Firm and Type of Subsidyab 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 
Dependent Variables Long term debt Short term debt External equity finance 
      
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.17 -0.02 0.29 
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 * Starter -0.01 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.83* 0.44 
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 * Type 
subsidy 0.44** 0.22 0.09 0.22 0.03 0.35 
Subsidy_rejected
 t / t-1 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.30 
Liquidityt-1 1.09** 0.52 -1.14* 0.62 -0.30 0.73 
Dividend ratiot-1 1.70* 0.93 1.52 0.92 -24.92* 13.75 
Cashflow ratiot-1 -0.67** 0.33 -0.39 0.33 -0.09 0.33 
Leveraget-1 -1.05*** 0.30 -0.46* 0.28 1.50*** 0.31 
Intangible assetst-1 -0.87 0.86 -0.58 0.86 1.38* 0.82 
Tangible assetst-1 -2.18*** 0.42 0.65 0.42 -0.67 0.63 
Firm sizet-1 1.22*** 0.12 0.55*** 0.11 0.44*** 0.13 
       
Number of observations          4 425           3 914           1 656  
Number of groups             714             630              300  
Log likelihood    -1 498.10    -1 426.60        -506.78  
P-value of log likelihood test        <.0001     <.0001         <.0001  
a
 Dependent variable equals 1 if financing event occurs, 0 otherwise. 
b Year dummies are not reported here. 
     * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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TABLE 7 
Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Model: External Financing Events Following 
Subsidies: Testing Interaction Effects for Size of Subsidyab 
 
 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 
Dependent Variables Long term debt Short term debt External equity finance 
      
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 0.27* 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.19 
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1* Relative 
size subsidy 0.44 1.24 2.03 1.29 2.13 1.21 
Subsidy_rejected
 t / t-1 0.27 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.47 0.37 
Liquidityt-1 1.01* 0.51 -1.42* 0.64 0.60 0.65 
Dividend ratiot-1 1.58* 0.92 1.35 0.98 -32.00 15.70 
Cashflow ratiot-1 -0.49 0.33 -0.21 0.32 -0.42 0.33 
Leveraget-1 -0.90** 0.29 -0.36 0.27 1.22 0.28 
Intangible assetst-1 -0.48 0.84 -0.87 0.89 1.69 0.86 
Tangible assetst-1 -2.16*** 0.43    0.79* 0.43 -0.27 0.61 
Firm sizet-1 1.04*** 0.11 0.51*** 0.10 0.26 0.12 
       
Number of observations 
         4 551             3 998           1 753  
Number of groups 
           728              639              314  
Log likelihood   -1 558.14     -1 455.63        -542.84  
P-value of log likelihood test        <.0001     <.0001         <.0001  
a
 Dependent variable equals 1 if financing event occurs, 0 otherwise. 
b Year dummies are not reported here. 
  * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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TABLE 8 
Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Model: External Financing Events Following 
Subsidies: Controlling for Financing Need Created by Receiving Subsidyab 
 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 
Dependent Variables Long term debt Short term debt External equity finance 
      
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 0.29** 0.11 0.19* 0.11 0.18 0.18 
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 * 
Percentage project not funded 
by subsidy 
4.91*** 0.80 1.28* 0.71 3.61*** 0.88 
Subsidy_rejected
 t / t-1 0.15 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.30 
Liquidityt-1 1.16** 0.53 -1.17* 0.62 -0.33 0.76 
Dividend ratiot-1 1.92** 0.93 1.53* 0.92 -24.30* 13.86 
Cashflow ratiot-1 -0.55 0.34 -0.37 0.33 -0.15 0.34 
Leveraget-1 -1.03*** 0.30 -0.47* 0.28 1.41*** 0.31 
Intangible assetst-1 -0.68 0.87 -0.48 0.86 1.21 0.86 
Tangible assetst-1 -2.14*** 0.43 0.68 0.42 -0.50 0.64 
Firm sizet-1 1.44*** 0.12 0.60*** 0.11 0.59*** 0.15 
       
Number of observations         4 425           3 914           1 656  
Number of groups            714             630              300  
Log likelihood   -1 477.61    -1 425.64        -498.47  
P-value of log likelihood test       <.0001     <.0001         <.0001  
a
 Dependent variable equals 1 if financing event occurs, 0 otherwise. 
b Year dummies are not reported here. 
 * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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TABLE 9 
Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Model: External Financing Events Following 
Subsidies: Controlling for Firm Qualityab 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 
Dependent Variables Long term debt Short term debt External equity finance 
      
Subsidy_received
 t / t-1 0.71** 0.27 -0.20 0.24 -0.61 0.51 
Subsidy_rejected
 t / t-1 0.05 0.52 0.12* 0.39 -0.27 0.91 
Financial health 0.67** 0.31 0.49 0.28 0.35* 0.19 
Liquidityt-1 -2.98 2.22 -1.39 2.43 -1.58 3.40 
Dividend ratiot-1 4.49** 2.27 1.22 2.09 -11.28 11.11 
Cashflow ratiot-1 -1.70 1.35 -1.48 1.18 -2.69* 1.38 
Leveraget-1 -0.56 1.34 0.70 1.30 5.96*** 1.47 
Intangible assetst-1 2.82 4.08 -2.56 3.84 10.19*** 3.55 
Tangible assetst-1 -3.21** 1.39 1.08 1.15 -3.48 2.29 
Firm sizet-1 2.53*** 0.48 1.27*** 0.37 2.09*** 0.70 
       
Number of observations         817           999              357  
Number of groups         144          172                67  
Log likelihood       -249.82      -361.15          -86.39  
P-value of log likelihood test        <.0001      0.4152         <.0001  
a
 Dependent variable equals 1 if financing event occurs, 0 otherwise. 
b Year dummies are not reported here. 
 * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
